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11 Introduction
In models of life cycle behavior and inter-temporal decision making under uncertainty, ex-
pectations play an important role. For example, consumption, saving, and labour supply
decisions of individuals and households not only depend on their current tastes and oppor-
tunities, but also on what they expect to be the future prices, their future income, etc.
Future expectations often remain unobserved, and traditional macro- or micro-economic
models typically make assumptions on how they are formed, e.g. assuming rational expecta-
tions. The conclusions from these models may be biased if the assumptions on expectations
are not satisﬁed. To solve the problem that expectations are unobserved, many recent empir-
ical studies aim at measuring expectations directly using survey questions. See, for example,
Manski (2004) for an assessment of the validity of this approach. Examples are Keane and
Runkle (1990) on inﬂation expectations, Dominitz and Manski (2005) on expectations of eq-
uity returns, Dominitz and Manski (1997), Das et al. (1999) and Dominitz (2001) on income
expectations, Hurd and McGary (1995) on length of life expectations, Stephens (2004) on
job loss expectations, Benitez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) on retirement expectations, Dominitz
and Manski (2006) on pension beneﬁt expectations, and Delavande and Rohwedder (2008)
on expectations of old age social security income.
Pension expectations have become particularly relevant since ageing of the population has
led to a debate on whether the pension system is sustainable and has led to pension reforms
in many industrialized countries (see, for example, Lindbeck and Persson, 2003, and Zaidi,
2010). Particularly since the economic and ﬁnancial crisis, high retirement replacement rates
can no longer be taken for granted. Governments are trying to increase awareness of pension
risks and individual responsibility to guarantee ﬁnancial security after retirement.
In this paper, we analyze expectations of the Dutch population of ages 25 and older
concerning the future generosity of the two main pillars of the Dutch system of income
provision to the elderly – old age social security beneﬁts (AOW) and occupational pensions
2(mandatory for almost all employees). Like in many other European countries, sustainability
of income provision at old age has become an important issue in public policy discussions
due to the ageing of the population; see, e.g., Bovenberg and Gradus (2008). Generous
early retirement beneﬁts are gradually being phased out and replaced by actuarially fair
ﬂexible retirement systems and the idea of working after the normal retirement age of 65
years has slowly become a real option, although impediments remain (e.g., Van Solinge and
Henkens, 2007). The debate has been reinforced by the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, leading
to additional pressure on old age social security due to government budget concerns and to
pressure on occupational pensions caused by the reduced value of the assets of occupational
pension funds, who have invested part of the pension savings of their clients in equity. This
makes it particularly interesting to analyze how diﬀerent socio-economic groups forecast the
future of the Dutch pension system and whether and how these forecasts have changed during
the recent years under the inﬂuence of the public discussion and the ﬁnancial and economic
crisis.
The ﬁrst reason why we think studying subjective beliefs is important is for economic
modelling. Many studies in the past, some already reviewed above, disproved the rational
expectation hypothesis as the heterogeneity in beliefs observed in elicited subjective expec-
tations is at odds with the rationality hypothesis. In our sample, at each given point in time,
all the respondents are asked to predict the same outcome and in principle have access to
the same information, so that under the assumption of rational expectations, they should all
come to the same conclusion. Our data reveal that they do not. One of the explanations for
this heterogeneity could be that some groups lack the proper cognitive skills or are not willing
to invest time to form rational beliefs. Analyzing how groups with diﬀerent socio-economic
characteristics vary in their subjective expectations makes it possible to test the assumption
of rational expectations for the population as a whole (although it will not be possible to
determine who has rational expectations and who has not, or which mechanisms drives the
3non-rationalities). Moreover, it is of interest to analyze to which extent the heterogeneity
in beliefs can be explained by observable respondent characteristics, since this determines
the usefulness of collecting this type of information at the micro level in future surveys. If
socio-economic characteristics would perfectly predict the beliefs, the subjective beliefs would
not contain additional information.
Second, misguided expectations may have a negative impact on future well-being of vul-
nerable groups in society (see, for example, Rohwedder and van Soest, 2006). In particular,
overly optimistic beliefs may lead to “under-saving.”1 It is therefore important to see if
diﬀerent socio-economic groups have realistic views of the future, and to what extent their
misconceptions could impair their future well-being. This information could be useful for
economists concerned with the mechanisms behind the formation of beliefs and could of-
fer policy makers new ways of designing eﬀective solutions to improper saving among the
diﬀerent groups.
Since the summer of 2006, monthly survey data were collected on the expectations of
Dutch households concerning occupational pensions, old age social security, and the average
retirement age ten or twenty years from the time of the interview. The same data (but for a
shorter time period) have been analyzed by Van der Wiel (2009) who focuses on the eﬀect of
the number of newspaper articles on the volatility of social security expectations, and Van
der Wiel (2008) who analyzes the relation between these expectations and savings decisions.
We will investigate how social security, occupational pension and average retirement age
expectations have changed over time and how they vary with socio-economic characteristics.
Since we use data collected until September 2010, we can also analyze the eﬀect of the recent
crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the sample
1On the other hand, a recent study by De Grip, Lindeboom and Montizaan (2009) also suggests that
there is a direct eﬀect of expectations on well-being, implying that the eﬀect of overly optimistic beliefs on
life-time well-being is not unambiguously negative.
4design and the expectations questions. Section 3 describes how the answers vary over time
and associates this with the public policy debate in the Netherlands. In section 4, we analyze
some empirical models relating pension expectations to background characteristics. Section
5 concludes.
2 Sample Design and Survey Questions
The survey was administered to members of the CentERpanel, an ongoing Internet panel
managed by CentERdata, a data collection and applied research institute aﬃliated with
Tilburg University. The sample is based upon a simple random sample from the population
in the Netherlands of ages 16 and older and consists of over 2000 households in which one or
more adults complete questionnaires at home every weekend over the Internet. Households
without Internet access are provided with Internet access by CentERdata so that the survey
also covers households without Internet or without a personal computer. About 75% of all
panel members respond to the questions in a given weekend. Rich background information
about the panel respondents is available from previous interviews.2
The speciﬁc survey on pension expectations works with a rotation period of three months.
The total sample of respondents of ages 25 and older was randomly split into three subsamples
of about the same size. One subsample gets the questions in January, April, July and October;
the second subsample in February, May, August and November, etc. This implies that there
are observations for one third of the sample in each month.3 In this study, we draw on all
the data collected between May 2006 and September 2010.
In addition to the questions on future expectations that we will analyze, the survey asks
questions on the respondents’ personal retirement situations, on their satisfaction with several
aspects of their retirement provisions, and on opinions on and satisfaction with the pension
2 See http://www.centerdata.nl/en/TopMenu/Wat_doen_we/Dataverzameling/CentERpanel/index.html
and http://www.centerdata.nl/en/TopMenu/Projecten/DNB_household_study/ .
3 In May and June 2006 (the ﬁrst two months of the survey) everyone was invited to participate instead
of one third of the sample.
5system in general. These questions are analyzed elsewhere (De Bresser and van Soest, 2009).
The expectations questions have been asked in the form of subjective probabilities. Ac-
cording to Manski (2004), this is the best way to elicit information concerning people’s
subjective distributions of future outcomes. Subjective probability questions have been ex-
tensively used and validated in US surveys, particularly the Health and Retirement Study
which has subjective probability questions on expected retirement age, on expected old age
social security income, on expected length of life, on future health problems that limit the
ability to work, and on the probability to leave a bequest (see Juster and Suzman, 1995;
Hurd, 2009).
The ﬁrst questions are about old age social security beneﬁt levels (AOW: Algemene Oud-
erdoms Wet). According to the current system, everyone who has been a resident of the
Netherlands from age 15 to age 65 is fully eligible for these beneﬁts. The amount is de-
termined by the oﬃcial minimum subsistence level4 and depends on partnership status but
usually not on earnings or employment history. There is one exception: if one spouse is older
than 65 and the other is younger than 65, the couple receives the amount for singles if the
younger spouse has a paid job, but the full amount for the couple if the younger spouse does
not do any paid work; the additional amount received in the latter case is called the “partner
allowance”. It will be abolished in 2015, and this has already been announced long before
the start of our survey in 2006. The wording of the ﬁrst series of questions was:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the purchasing
power of AOW beneﬁts will on average be
• Less than now?
• At least 10 percent less than now?
• More than now?
4The 2010 amounts (including vacation allowance) are €1075 for singles and €1478 for couples.
6• At least 10 percent more than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will deﬁnitely
not happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
Half of the sample got the questions with 10 years from now; the other half with 20
years from now, with randomized assignment.5 All answers from 0 to 100 were allowed for;
consistency restrictions (e.g., second answer larger than the ﬁrst one) were not imposed and
were indeed sometimes violated by the respondents. Note that the ﬁrst and third answer
may well add up to less than 100 since people may attach a positive probability to the event
that purchasing power remains the same. This applies in particular to the purchasing power
of AOW beneﬁts since, in the current system, they are ﬁxed at the minimum subsistence
level and reforms proposed until now do not change that (though for couples to whom the
“Partner allowance” applies, the purchasing power of the total beneﬁt will decrease in 2015
– see above).
The second set of questions concerns the purchasing power of second pillar pensions.
Essentially all employees in the Netherlands participate in mandatory pension schemes or-
ganized at the ﬁrm or industry level, which in most cases guarantees them a deﬁned beneﬁt
occupational pension that increases with their earnings. There are diﬀerences, however, in,
e.g., how the pension level varies with the pattern of life cycle earnings or whether pension
beneﬁts keep track with inﬂation. The wording of the questions was similar to that for AOW
beneﬁts:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the average pur-
chasing power of occupational pensions will be
• Less than now?
5 This randomization was independent across waves, so the same person could get the questions with 10
years in one wave and with 20 years in another wave; in a given wave, all questions (in all four sets) for a
given respondent had 10 years, or they all had 20 years.
7• At least 10 percent less than now?
• More than now?
• At least 10 percent more than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will deﬁnitely
not happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
The answers to these questions may be aﬀected by the problems faced by occupational
pension funds due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Many pension funds have experienced a reduction
of the accumulated pension wealth of their clients due to falling stock prices, and have
announced not to compensate pension amounts for inﬂation in the near future to cope with
this problem. In the long run, this may lead to much lower pension levels in real (purchasing
power) terms.
The third set of questions is about the eligibility age for old age social security beneﬁts:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the age at which
people are entitled to AOW beneﬁts will on average be
• Higher than now?
• At least two years higher than now?
• Lower than now?
• At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will deﬁnitely
not happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
8This question touches the core of the Dutch policy discussion since 2008, which focuses
on raising the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts from 65 to 66 or 67 for cohorts that will reach
age 65 after a certain date (this date is also part of the discussion).6
The ﬁnal set of questions we will analyze refers to the retirement age.7 The wording of
the questions about the retirement age is:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the age at which
people stop working will on average be
• Higher than now?
• At least two years higher than now?
• Lower than now?
• At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will deﬁnitely
not happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
Although the current policy debate is more about postponing AOW beneﬁts than about
ﬁxing the retirement age, the common view is that later entitlement to AOW beneﬁts will
also lead to later retirement.
3 Time Trends and Age Patterns in Pension Expectations
During the time period covered by our data, there have been several lively policy debates
on public and private pension reforms. Already long before the ﬁnancial and economic
crisis, policy makers saw the need to reform the public pension system due to the ageing
6The plan launched in September 2009 was to implement the changes 10 years from now, not aﬀecting
those who are currently older than 55; this plan was not implemented because the government stepped down,
and the debate is now still ongoing.
7We did not feel it was useful to ask about the eligibility age for occupational pensions, because with
increasing ﬂexibility and actuarially fair choices, the formal eligibility age can be quite low but with unattrac-
tively low pension beneﬁts this is not very meaningful.
9of the population (see, for example, Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008). The rising government
budget deﬁcit during the crisis starting in 2008 has strengthened the need for reforms of state
pensions, but, partly due to the resignation of the government early 2010 and the long time
it took to form a new government, ﬁnal decisions have still not been made. Occupational
pension funds, confronted with negative returns on their investments in the stock market,
have emphasized the need to reduce the generosity of pension beneﬁts, involving lower beneﬁts
or later retirement, to avoid that pension premiums keep rising. In this section, we investigate
how the general public’s expectations of the generosity of the pension system have changed
during the time period 2006 - 2010 and to which extent they have responded to the policy
discussion.
Figures 1 shows how the average answers to the probability questions on the purchasing
power of AOW beneﬁts have developed over the time period covered by the survey (May
2006 - September 2010).8 Before discussing the time patterns, some other ﬁndings are worth
noting. First, the average probabilities are consistent, in the sense that the ﬁrst probability
(“less than now”) always exceeds the second one (“at least 10% less than now”), the third
probability (“more than now”) always exceeds the fourth one (“at least 10% more”), and the
sum of the ﬁrst and third probability is always much less than 100%, implying that, on
average, a substantial positive probability of about 30% is attached to the event that the
purchasing power of AOW beneﬁts will not change. This is in line with the notion that
receiving AOW beneﬁts only should put household income on the oﬃcial poverty line, giving
a ﬁxed purchasing power level over time, in principle.
Second, the ﬁgures are asymmetric, revealing a general sense of “pessimism”: the average
probability that purchasing power will fall is much larger than the probability that it will rise;
and the average probability that purchasing power will fall by at least 10% is much larger
than the probability that it will rise by at least 10%. This may seem surprising since there
8 The ﬁgures are weighted with sample weights to correct for unit non-response related to gender, age,
and education.
10Figure 1: The probability of changes in the purchasing power of the AOW beneﬁts 10 or 20
years from now
are no plans to change the purchasing power of these beneﬁts, which, as explained above,
are in principle determined by the oﬃcial poverty line. On the other hand, it might reﬂect
that some respondents are aware of the future removal of the “Partner allowance”, which,
although it applies to a limited subgroup of the elderly only, will reduce the average beneﬁt
per person or per household.
Third, there seem to be no systematic diﬀerences between the “10 years from now” and
the “20 years from now” probabilities, although there are some non-negligible diﬀerences in
speciﬁc months. Perhaps most respondents see 10 or 20 years simply as in the long run and
do not make any distinction.
Hardly any time trend is found in the probabilities of an increase, an increase by 10%
or more, or a fall by 10% or more. The lack of time trend may reﬂect the fact that the
11current policy debate does not concern the level of AOW beneﬁts (the decision to remove
the “Partner allowance” was already made in 1995). The only small time trend we ﬁnd is for
the probability that beneﬁts will fall in real terms, although even here, the pattern is not
completely consistent and somewhat diﬀerent for the 10 and 20 years groups. Still, we can
conclude that pessimism has increased since the beginning of 2008 and particularly during
the last 12 months of the survey.
Figures 2 shows the average answers to the probability questions on occupational pension
levels, separately for the groups who got the “10 years from now” and the “20 years from
now” questions. We ﬁnd the same asymmetry revealing a general sense of pessimism. This
is less surprising than for the state beneﬁts, since the debate on sustainability of pensions
due to the ageing of the population was already quite active in 2006. Still, in principle
occupational pensions are fully funded and workers save for their own occupational pension,
so that population ageing should not directly aﬀect the purchasing power of these pensions
if pension premiums and returns to the assets in which they are invested remain at the same
level. As before, there are no systematic diﬀerences between the 10 and 20 years groups.
The trend towards larger pessimism is a lot stronger here than in the expectations con-
cerning AOW beneﬁts. Subjective probabilities that occupational pensions will fall in real
terms have clearly risen since early 2008. This suggests that respondents have anticipated
the problems that pension funds were going to face due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Not much has
changed in 2009 when it became clear that many pensions were no longer fully funded. The
probabilities that occupational pensions will fall by at least 10% have risen as well, though by
much less. Accordingly, the probabilities that the purchasing power of occupational pensions
will increase or will increase by 10% or more have fallen, particularly since 2009.
Figures 3 shows how expectations concerning the eligibility age for state beneﬁts change
over time. Here the asymmetry is even larger than for the pension and AOW beneﬁt levels.
The average reported probability that the eligibility age will fall (or will fall by at least 2
12Figure 2: The probability of changes in the purchasing power of occupational pensions 10 or
20 years from now
years) is quite small and might be upward biased by reporting errors of respondents who
did not understand the questions or did not answer them seriously. The average reported
probability that the eligibility age will increase over the next ten years was already about
60% in May 2006, rose to about 70% in the Summer of 2009 and to about 75% in Summer
2010. A similar clear trend towards more pessimism can be observed for the “20 years from
now” group. The trend is quite plausible and in line with the announced reforms.
The ﬁgures also reveal that respondents were relatively pessimistic in the ﬁrst few months
of the survey (May and June 2006), probably due to the fact that the Social Democrats an-
nounced they wanted to reduce eligibility or generosity of AOW beneﬁts to cope with the
increasing costs due to population ageing. In the months after that, these plans were weak-
ened and other parties expressed disagreement, which is probably why respondents became
13Figure 3: The probability of changes in eligibility age for the AOW 10 or 20 years from now
less pessimistic over the summer of 2006. Respondents’ optimism rose until the general
elections in November 2006. Shortly after that, several groups revitalized the discussion on
increasing the AOW eligibility age and labour force participation of older workers, and pes-
simism increased. Particularly since late 2008, inﬂuenced by the budget problems caused
by the crisis, government plans to change the AOW eligibility age took concrete form, and
increasing pessimism seems perfectly justiﬁed.
Figures 4 shows the development over time of expectations concerning the average age at
which people will stop working 10 or 20 years from now. The asymmetry is similar to that
for the AOW eligibility age. The average reported probability that the retirement age will
increase over the next ten years rises from about 60% to more than 70% between 2006 and
2010. The trend is similar but somewhat less salient for the “20 years from now” group. The
probability that in the next ten or twenty years the retirement age will rise by two or more
14years increases less, from about 50% to about 55%.
Figure 4: The probability of changes in the average age at which people will stop working 10
or 20 years from now
The patterns in 2006 are similar to those in Figures 3a and 3b. People are pessimistic at
ﬁrst (Summer 2006) but pessimism falls until the general elections in November. In the ﬁrst
few months of 2007, the new government launched a plan to stimulate labour force partic-
ipation of older workers by making AOW beneﬁts dependent on participation in the years
before the normal retirement age. In response to this, the number of respondents expecting
an increase in the average retirement age rose. The eﬀect disappeared when the government
plans appeared to be infeasible. In spring 2008 the expected average retirement age rose
again, possibly because some respondents already feared that the ﬁnancial crisis would aﬀect
the accumulated pension wealth invested by pension funds. Respondents’ expectations then
remained approximately constant until the summer of 2009, but pessimism increased during
15the last period (Fall 2009 - Fall 2010).
The probability questions ask about general events and if everyone would have the same
information set and the same way of forming their subjective distributions (like rational
expectations), there should be no systematic association with respondent characteristics. We
will analyze this for a large set of individual characteristics in multivariate regressions in the
next section. Here we present the relation between the probabilities concerning changing
the eligibility age for state beneﬁts (see Figure 3) with gender (Figure 5) and age (Figure
6). Figure 5 shows the time pattern for men and women separately. The trend is almost
identical for men and women. In most time periods, the two curves on the probabilities of
postponing eligibility suggest that men are somewhat less pessimistic than women, but the
diﬀerences are small.
Figure 5: Expectations concerning the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts 10 or 20 years from
now for men and women
16Figure 6 shows how the subjective probabilities vary with respondent age, combining
data from all available time periods.9 These ﬁgures show that pessimism concerning the
state pension eligibility age falls with age. For example, the average percentage probability
that the state pension eligibility age will be increased is about 60% for respondents of 30
years old, but only about 40% for respondents of age 70. The average probability that the
same eligibility age will rise by at least two years is about 40% for the youngest group and
only 25% for the oldest age group. A surprisingly similar age pattern is found for the other
questions (results available upon request from the authors) and the age patterns seem even
stronger than the time trends discussed above. Interpreting the age patterns in terms of
general optimism or pessimism, these results suggest the opposite of those of Dominitz and
Manski (2005), who ﬁnd that young people have more optimistic expectations on equity
returns than older people.
4 Empirical models of beliefs
In this section, we will assess the impact of respondents’ demographic characteristics on their
reported retirement expectations. We are interested in knowing if some groups in society are
particularity pessimistic or display unwarranted optimism toward retirement. As emphasized
in Section 1, there are several reasons why we think this is important: to test the rational
expectations hypothesis and to determine the usefulness of collecting this type of information
at the micro level in future surveys, and to analyze the potential negative impact of misguided
perceptions of the future on well-being for vulnerable groups in society, in particular through
“under-saving.”
4.1 Model speciﬁcation
Following the concerns expressed above and the descriptive results in the previous section,
we focus our attention on the questions concerning negative outcomes. Given the current
situation of pensions, changes to the actual policy that would curb the cost of the systems
9 Estimations obtained using local linear regression with Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 2 years.
17Figure 6: Expectations concerning the eligibility age for AOW beneﬁts 10 or 20 years from
now as a function of respondent age
are more relevant than changes that would exacerbate them. We model eight dependent
variables: the answers to the questions concerning a general decrease or a decrease of more
than 10% in the generosity of the old age social security beneﬁts (AOW) and of occupational
pensions, and the answers to questions concerning a general increase or an increase of at least
two years in the age of eligibility to AOW beneﬁts and of the average retirement age in the
Netherlands.
All dependent variables are subjective probabilities and take values between 0 %-points
and 100 %-points, and a substantial number of respondents used these extreme values as
answers: the percentage of zeros varies from 2.2% to 11.9%, and the fraction of 100% answers
varies from 4.6% to 22.5%. We take into account the censored nature of the variables in our
estimations by estimating two-limit tobit speciﬁcations. Eight separate models are used for
18each of the probability questions concerning the more pessimistic outcomes (levels of state
and occupational pensions lower or at least 10% lower; eligibility age for state pensions and
average retirement age delayed or delayed by at least two years); the probabilities of the
optimistic outcomes are always rather low and will not be analyzed further.
Over time, all respondents were asked to answer the questions up to 15 times, allowing us
to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the respondent level, using panel data techniques.
We therefore use random-eﬀects Tobit models with censoring both on the left at 0, and on
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it is a latent variable, determined by a vector of explanatory variables xit, an
unobserved individual eﬀect i and an idiosyncratic error term it. The observed probability
Pit is obtained from P 
it through censoring at both ends, implying positive probabilities of
reporting 0 and 100. The individual eﬀects and error terms are assumed to follow normal
distributions independent of the xit , as in the standard random eﬀects tobit model. The
model parameters (,  and ) are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood. Estimates
are obtained using Stata.
The same independent variables xit were included in all eight models. First, we include
a set of basic demographic and socio-economic respondent and household characteristics: a
10 In some households, both spouses answered the questions. We do not account for the potential correlation
between error terms of individual eﬀects of respondents in the same household.
19dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent is a male, age of the respondent, age-squared,
a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent lives with a partner. We control
for education using dummies for middle and high education, using low education as the
reference class. To capture employment status, we include dummy variables with value 1
if the respondent is retired, disabled (or partially disabled), unemployed, homemaker, and
for working in the public sector; the benchmark group are those who work in the private
sector. We included time dummies for each month (except one) in order to control for
macro-economic shocks on beliefs, like the ﬁnancial and economic crisis. We also included a
dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the question concerned a 10-year horizon and value
1 if the question concerned a 20-year horizon.
Controlling for the net income of the respondents leads to several issues. First, the survey
asked for monthly income, but some respondents reported an amount that is unreasonably
large for this period. These respondents possibly gave their yearly income. Hence, we con-
sidered observations with income larger than €8,000 a month as outliers and removed them
from the sample. The second problem is widespread in surveys where respondents are asked
to disclose their income: there is a large number of respondents answering “don’t know” or
“refuse.” In our case, the respondents were oﬀered the explicit choice not to answer the
question concerning income. Only a handful of them used this option. However, and this is
our third problem, a large number of respondents reported a net personal income of 0 and
many of these answers should probably be interpreted as refusals. The 0-answers raise two
problems. The ﬁrst is that income will be measured with error if some of these 0 are indeed
non-response. The second problem arises because we follow the usual strategy to include
log-income rather than income. We include the log-income when available, replacing it by
0 for missing values and for a reported income of 0. In addition, we include two dummy
variables: one for those who declared an income of 0 and one for unknown or undisclosed
incomes.
20In Table 1, we present the mean values of the explanatory variables in the ﬁrst month
(when everyone of age 25 and older was asked to participate in the survey) and in the
last three months (when one third participated each month, so that the last three months
cover the complete sample). The table shows that the means of most of the variables are
quite stable over time. We also see that very few respondents did not report an income
(none in the ﬁrst month, 10 in the last three months). Not all respondents always answered
the questions, due to refreshment, attrition, or temporary non-participation (e.g., holidays).
About 1,300 respondents answered in the ﬁrst month and in the last three months, but in
total, 2,780 respondents took part in the survey over time. Average age is relatively high,
because all respondents of age 25 and older are asked to answer the questions (with no upper
age limit). Median net personal income (zeros excluded) rises from €1,200 in the ﬁrst month
to about €1,515 at the end of the survey period; there is no correction for inﬂation. The
average education level also increases over time (low education is the reference category). The
fraction of homemakers is falling over time, while the number of public sector employees is
rising. A large fraction of all workers (almost 40%) are in the public sector, which is deﬁned
in a broad sense, including, for example, the (semi-public) health and education sectors.
The dummy “In 20 years” has value 1 if the questions referred to 20 years from now and 0
otherwise; the time period in the questions was randomly drawn, independent of all other
variables and with equal probabilities for “10 years” and “20 years” so that by design its ex
ante mean should be equal to 0.5. The ex post mean is somewhat diﬀerent, mainly due to
non-response.
4.2 Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Since we estimated the equations
separately, we do not consider the correlations between the error terms or between the unob-
served heterogeneity terms of the diﬀerent equations. We consider a 5%-signiﬁcance level in
discussing which variables are signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant. Note that the models all explain






Log. net-inc. (if inc. > 0) 7.165 7.323
Inc. = 0 0.108 0.102
Unk. Inc. 0.024 0.007
Educ. Med. 0.253 0.243






Public sector 0.212 0.245
In 20 years 0.512 0.482
N 1,309 1,121
Note: Means use respondents included in at least one of the regressions;
means are weighted with sample weights based upon age, gender and education.
the subjective probability of a negative outcome, so a positive sign in the estimates indicates
an increase in pessimism if the independent variable increases.11
The results vary across the eight probabilities, but we observe some common patterns.
First, males express signiﬁcantly lower probabilities when it comes to the four worst-case
scenarios, indicating that men are less pessimistic than women, in line with ﬁndings in the
ﬁnance literature (Barber and Odean, 2001). For example, the estimated probability that
the state beneﬁt eligibility age will rise by at least two years is more than four percentage
points higher for men than for women, keeping other characteristics constant. This is a much
11The estimates of the slope coeﬃcients cannot be interpreted as marginal eﬀects on the expected subjective
probabilities, due to the non-linearity of the model. The marginal eﬀect of a covariate is equal to the estimated
parameter times the probability to be uncensored; for the average respondent, this probability varies from
0.747 to 0.865 over the eight questions.
22Table 2: Estimation Results Two-Limit Tobit Models with Random Eﬀects: Probabilities of
Negative Changes in Future Generosity of State and Occupational Pensions
Generosity of AOW Generosity of occ. pension
Less... At least 10% less... Less... At least 10% less...
Male -0.993 -4.761*** -2.057* -4.598***
(-0.778) (-4.256) (-1.659) (-4.222)
Partner 2.937** 2.883*** 1.925* 1.549
(2.539) (2.803) (1.714) (1.552)
Age 0.788*** 0.515** 0.220 -0.008
(3.179) (2.350) (0.916) (-0.040)
Age-sqr./100 -1.199*** -0.726*** -0.664*** -0.263
(-5.021) (-3.432) (-2.862) (-1.280)
Log. net-inc. 1.311* 0.145 -0.160 -1.088*
(1.729) (0.212) (-0.217) (-1.645)
Inc. = 0 7.921 0.520 -1.816 -6.837
(1.538) (0.111) (-0.363) (-1.517)
Unk. Inc. 8.073 6.125 0.265 -0.313
(1.309) (1.094) (0.044) (-0.058)
Educ. Med. -5.441** -3.039 -1.741 -0.124
(-2.093) (-1.334) (-0.691) (-0.056)
Educ. High 4.018 0.550 3.538 0.308
(1.591) (0.248) (1.445) (0.143)
Self-employed -0.942 1.861 -2.730 -0.572
(-0.453) (1.003) (-1.355) (-0.318)
Retired 1.905 -0.265 -0.327 -1.130
(1.238) (-0.191) (-0.218) (-0.841)
Disabled -2.636 -0.691 -2.896 -0.664
(-1.251) (-0.365) (-1.411) (-0.362)
Homemaker -2.302 -3.341** -3.564** -4.848***
(-1.279) (-2.069) (-2.039) (-3.106)
Unemployed 2.507 4.717** 1.679 5.872***
(1.093) (2.272) (0.760) (2.959)
Public sector 2.461** 1.065 2.371** 1.547
(2.114) (1.029) (2.103) (1.545)
In 20 years 0.274 3.029*** -0.313 1.936***
(0.694) (8.267) (-0.818) (5.517)
Constant 36.961*** 39.011*** 55.246*** 53.055***
(4.455) (5.273) (6.848) (7.396)
Num. Ind. 3,030 3,027 3,033 3,032
Num. Obs. 25,899 25,746 26,017 25,990
 0.452 0.407 0.451 0.418
 26.555 22.763 25.846 22.330
 29.256 27.448 28.500 26.323
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses
Stars denote signiﬁcance: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level
23Table 3: Estimation Results Two-Limit Tobit Models with Random Eﬀects: Probabilities of
Delays in Eligibility to AOW Beneﬁts and Average Retirement Age.
Eligibility to AOW General ret. age
Later... At least 2 yrs later... Later... At least 2 yrs later...
Male -0.439 -5.344*** -0.683 -5.378***
(-0.364) (-4.477) (-0.613) (-4.976)
Partner 4.761*** 3.588*** 3.900*** 3.020***
(4.389) (3.316) (3.911) (3.086)
Age -0.588** -0.686*** 0.116 -0.020
(-2.512) (-2.954) (0.539) (-0.095)
Age-sqr./100 0.263 0.554** -0.300 -0.041
(1.166) (2.473) (-1.451) (-0.204)
Log. net-inc. 2.755*** 1.607** 2.208*** 1.880***
(3.843) (2.234) (3.398) (2.912)
Inc. = 0 16.230*** 11.219** 14.976*** 13.041***
(3.340) (2.293) (3.399) (2.969)
Unk. Inc. 20.472*** 13.572** 14.541*** 16.251***
(3.537) (2.329) (2.770) (3.106)
Educ. Med. -2.226 0.265 0.520 0.567
(-0.909) (0.109) (0.230) (0.258)
Educ. High 1.707 -0.116 4.525** 0.028
(0.716) (-0.049) (2.055) (0.013)
Self-employed -1.361 1.824 -0.842 1.457
(-0.700) (0.934) (-0.473) (0.826)
Retired 4.182*** 1.860 1.023 0.794
(2.878) (1.281) (0.777) (0.608)
Disabled -2.833 0.272 -3.677** -0.133
(-1.438) (0.137) (-2.038) (-0.074)
Homemaker -0.738 -2.495 -3.175** -2.728*
(-0.437) (-1.472) (-2.065) (-1.788)
Unemployed 5.998*** 6.795*** 4.892** 5.781***
(2.838) (3.166) (2.567) (3.013)
Public sector 0.429 0.859 0.414 0.680
(0.394) (0.790) (0.416) (0.695)
In 20 years 4.624*** 8.305*** 2.775*** 5.791***
(12.660) (22.314) (8.445) (17.402)
Constant 63.417*** 59.447*** 47.458*** 40.875***
(8.079) (7.604) (6.613) (5.800)
Num. Ind. 3,033 3,032 3,035 3,035
Num. Obs. 26,037 26,004 26,044 26,031
 0.472 0.442 0.484 0.446
 25.230 24.735 23.567 22.525
 26.666 27.813 24.324 25.113
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses
Stars denote signiﬁcance: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level
24larger diﬀerence than the gender diﬀerence in Figure 5, where other characteristics were not
controlled for.
Second, respondents with a partner are signiﬁcantly more pessimistic in their four answers
concerning age of eligibility to AOW and retirement age. A possible explanation is that
couples are more concerned about retirement issues than singles and therefore pay more
attention to the public debate. Another possible explanation could be that respondents with
partners are often secondary earners working part-time, for whom income is not a good proxy
to ﬁnancial literacy or interest in ﬁnancial matters (see below).
In general, high income individuals more often believe that 10 or 20 years from now,
workers will retire later and the AOW eligibility age will rise. This view corresponds with
the opinion of “ﬁnancially literate” individuals. The dummies with value 1 if reported income
is 0 or if no income is reported are signiﬁcant for the four questions concerning eligibility
and retirement ages. In these cases, the ln(income) variable is set to zero. Taking this into
account implies that non- and zero-reporters are not very diﬀerent from those with an average
log income.12
We found hardly any signiﬁcant education eﬀects, perhaps because we already control
for income. In two cases, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between highly educated and low
educated respondents is positively signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The higher educated are more
pessimistic, which is again in line with the notion that pessimism is justiﬁed and the higher
educated respondents tend to be better informed. On the other hand, however, we also ﬁnd
in one case (generosity of state beneﬁts) that those with intermediate education level are less
pessimistic than respondents with low education.
Many of the dummies on employment status were signiﬁcant. Unemployed individuals
appear to be signiﬁcantly more pessimistic than private sector workers (the omitted category),
giving signiﬁcantly lower answers to all “worst-case” scenarios (at least 10% less, at least 2
12The average log income is about 7.25, so we should compare the coeﬃcients on the dummies with 7.25
times the coeﬃcient on log income.
25years later) and to the questions concerning a later eligibility age for state pensions and a
later average age of retirement. The coeﬃcient on the home maker dummy is always negative
and often signiﬁcant, suggesting that home makers are less pessimistic than employees in the
private sector. Retired and disabled respondents are not very diﬀerent from private sector
workers (everything else held constant), though retired individuals seem to believe more often
that the eligibility to AOW beneﬁts will be delayed while those receiving disability beneﬁts
less often think that the retirement age will rise. Public sector workers are more pessimistic
than private sector workers but the diﬀerences are only marginally signiﬁcant.
Age generally has a signiﬁcant eﬀect and the marginal eﬀect of age is usually negative for
most of the sample. The maximum of the quadratic function of age is reached between 15 and
30 year-old in the series where at least one of the age parameters is signiﬁcant. Note that our
sample includes respondents aged 25 or older, and the large majority of the respondents are
older than 30. Therefore, we can say that in general, keeping other characteristics constant,
younger individuals are more pessimistic concerning the pension system than older persons.
This is in line with the conclusion about the age patterns in the previous section (see Figure
6), where other characteristics were not kept constant. This ﬁnding is not explained by either
the knowledge or the general optimism arguments that we used above. Perhaps it relates
to the fact that, in spite of the fact that the question explicitly mentions “10 years from
now” or “20 years from now” respondents often answer the questions thinking about their
own pension provision at the time when they retire, which will probably be less generous for
younger people than for those who are already approaching retirement.
Finally, there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of asking questions concerning a 20-year
horizon rather than a 10-year horizon, indicating that respondents are more pessimistic con-
cerning pension provisions 20 years from now than concerning pensions 10 years from now.
This could be expected from the ﬁgures in the previous section and is in line with the fact
that the eﬀect of population ageing on, for example, the ratio between the 65+ and 65-
26population sizes, is expected to increase further during the next twenty years.13
The estimates of the standard deviations at the bottom of the table (  for the individual
eﬀects;  for the error terms) indicate that there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity:
between 40 and 50 percent of the total unexplained variation in the reported probabilities




also answers the second question we raised at the beginning of this section: the covariates
used in our model do not capture the heterogeneity in beliefs completely, and the reported
probabilities provide additional information, (not just noise – which might be the case if 
were negligible compared to . This is in line with the existing literature emphasizing the
value of subjective probabilities in survey data (see, e.g., Manski 2004), reinforcing the idea
that eliciting information of expectations is important for researchers interested in questions
related to retirement and pensions.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed expectations of the Dutch population of ages 25 and older concerning the
system of income provision after retirement. The recent trends and policy discussions that
seem to justify the expectation that future pensions will be less generous in terms of pension
levels, eligibility ages, or both, are reﬂected in the trend in expectations, but only to a limited
extent. Expectations seem to adjust only very slowly to the new reality and in this case this
probably implies that the Dutch population is probably too optimistic, on average. Our
micro-data also revealed substantial heterogeneity across and within socio-economic groups,
suggesting that the average optimism is due to the over-optimism of a substantial subsample,
whereas others may well have rational expectations.
The ﬁnding that men are less pessimistic than women is consistent with ﬁndings in ex-
isting studies in a diﬀerent context. The fact that richer (and higher educated) individuals
are signiﬁcantly more pessimistic concerning some aspects of retirement than poorer respon-
13See, for example, van Duin and Garssen (2011).
27dents is in line with a positive association between socio-economic status and knowledge
of the public debate on pension provisions. The ﬁnding that younger individuals are more
pessimistic than older respondents may relate to the fact that respondents often answer the
questions thinking about their own pension provision at the time when they retire (in spite
of the wording of the questions).
From an economic policy point of view, the results we have obtained in models that relate
expectations to socio-economic characteristics contain both good and bad news, under the
assumption that pessimism is justiﬁed and the more pessimistic respondents are also the most
realistic. That younger individuals are aware of the possible negative changes in pensions is
certainly comforting news, as long as they will adapt their saving behaviour accordingly. The
younger individuals, who are likely to witness changes to the pension system, have time and
room to adapt their employment career and their life-cycle saving plans to this new reality,
and can minimize an unwanted decline of well-being at retirement.
On the other hand, we view the fact that poorer individuals tend to be more optimistic as
bad news. The poorer individuals depend more on the old age social security beneﬁts than
their richer counterparts, and are therefore more aﬀected by a reduction in the generosity of
these beneﬁts. For the poorest among them, it might not make a lot of diﬀerence to anticipate
the changes, as they are not able to save for retirement and their income will probably consist
almost solely of social security anyhow. However, not anticipating the policy changes could
have a larger negative impact on the well-being of the middle class, who are likely to save
too little under erroneous beliefs concerning the future. An unrealistic view of the future of
public pensions could have important welfare eﬀects for these respondents.
Future research opportunities remain. Adding more waves of data will help to better
identify the long term consequences of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis. In addition, some
methodological improvements are possible. First, we already mentioned that the full infor-
mation on individual behaviour provided by the multidimensional panel structure is not fully
28exploited. We could control for general pessimism by estimating the equations jointly, and by
allowing the terms of individual heterogeneity to be correlated among individuals. Another
interesting step would be to jointly analyse the beliefs of respondents within a household,
and to assess if unwarranted optimism or pessimism is contagious among partners. Finally,
since respondents tend to answers our probability questions using focal answers such as “50
percent,” the assumptions needed for the Tobit model may not be justiﬁed, and a model that
explicitly account for the 50-50’s, other focal answers, and the rounding to multiples of 5 or
10 seems worthwhile to check the robustness of our results.
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